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Abstract  18 
Costly female mating preferences for purely Fisherian male traits (i.e. sexual ornaments that 19 
are genetically uncorrelated with inherent viability) are not expected to persist at equilibrium. 20 
The indirect benefit of producing ‘sexy sons’ (Fisher process) disappears: in some models the 21 
male trait becomes fixed, in others a range of male trait values persist but a larger trait 22 
confers no net fitness advantage because it lowers survival. Insufficient indirect selection to 23 
counter the direct cost of producing fewer offspring means that preferences are lost. The only 24 
well-cited exception assumes biased mutation on male traits. The above findings generally 25 
assume constant direct selection against female preferences (i.e., fixed costs). We show that if 26 
mate sampling costs are instead derived based on an explicit account of how females acquire 27 
mates, an initially costly mating preference can coevolve with a male trait so that both persist 28 
in the presence or absence of biased mutation. Our models predict that empirically detecting 29 
selection at equilibrium will be difficult, even if selection was responsible for the location of 30 
the current equilibrium. In general, it appears useful to integrate mate sampling theory with 31 
models of genetic consequences of mating preferences: being explicit about the process by 32 
which individuals select mates can alter equilibria. 33 
  34 
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Introduction 35 
The occurrence of extravagant sexual traits, usually in males, is an obvious feature of the 36 
natural world. In some cases these traits are functional weapons (e.g. horns and tusks). In 37 
other cases they are, however, purely ornamental (e.g. elongated tails, elaborate song, bright 38 
plumage). It is widely accepted that ornaments have evolved under sexual selection driven by 39 
female mate choice. One problem with this explanation is that extravagant male traits seem to 40 
be most common in species where the rewards of choosiness for females appear to be 41 
smallest. Specifically, in non-territorial species lacking male parental care, all that females 42 
appear to gain from males is sperm. The advantage of being choosy therefore seems to be 43 
associated with genetic (indirect) benefits that elevate net offspring fitness. This has led to a 44 
theoretical challenge often referred to as the ‘lek paradox’ (Kirkpatrick & Ryan, 1991). 45 
It is challenging to explain costly female mating preferences for ornamented males when 46 
females gain no direct benefits from choice. Fisher (1930) reasoned that choosy females 47 
indirectly benefit by producing ‘sexy sons’ (i.e. males with above average mating success). 48 
Indirect selection on the preference is based on a genetic correlation that arises between the 49 
female preference and the preferred male trait: choosy females prefer ornamented males, and 50 
there is direct positive selection on the male trait when it confers a sufficiently strong mating 51 
advantage to outweigh reduced male survival. A breakthrough in sexual selection theory was 52 
the validation of Fisher’s process using quantitative and population genetic models of 53 
preference-trait coevolution (Lande, 1981; Kirkpatrick, 1982).   54 
An assumption of these early models was that female choice is cost-free. This is an important 55 
assumption because once male trait expression reaches equilibrium, the indirect benefits of 56 
choosiness disappear. There is no longer additive genetic variation in fitness associated with 57 
the expression of the male trait. This occurs either because the trait goes to fixation, or, when 58 
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variation in trait expression remains, there is a perfect trade-off between its beneficial effect 59 
on male mating success and its detrimental effect on male survival (Lande, 1981). The net 60 
result is that choosy females no longer produce fitter sons, which eliminates indirect selection 61 
for the mating preference. At this point any costs of choosiness lead to direct selection against 62 
female mating preferences, which decline to their naturally selected optimum (usually 63 
assumed to be random mating). The male trait is consequently not maintained either.  64 
The best-known solution allowing a costly mating preference to persist is to invoke biased 65 
mutation on preferred male traits, thereby maintaining indirect benefits of choice 66 
(Pomiankowski et al., 1991). Biased mutation maintains additive genetic variation in fitness 67 
despite a directional mating preference. This demonstrates that Fisherian models can work 68 
when choosing is costly, but these costs have to be minute given realistic mutation rates. It 69 
seems that additional direct benefits and/or indirect viability benefits of choosiness are 70 
required (Maynard Smith et al., 1991; Kuijper et al., 2012).  71 
Frequency-dependent benefits are integral to female-choice models. Specifically, the 72 
magnitude of the mating advantage of ornamented males depends on the relative frequency of 73 
females with a mating preference that makes them more likely to mate with these males. 74 
Strangely, however, despite early theoretical discussion of how preference expression might 75 
depend on mate sampling tactics (O’Donald, 1980; Seger, 1985), equivalent frequency-76 
dependent costs of choosiness have attracted little attention. A notable exception is 77 
Pomiankowski (1988) who showed that frequency-dependent changes in the costs of mating 78 
preferences can alter equilibria. However, this early work made the verbal argument that 79 
because random mating with the first male encountered is the least costly option, it cannot be 80 
invaded by any other type of mate choice. Consequently, evolutionary competition between 81 
two types of non-random mating (preference for either ornamented or for non-ornamented 82 
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males) was modelled, such that preferences for the more common type of male were directly 83 
selected for.  84 
This study therefore deferred exploration of the crucial contrast between having a preference 85 
and mating randomly, which is at the heart of most mate choice evolution models (i.e. why 86 
preferences evolve when direct selection favours random mating). We show here that 87 
frequency-dependent costs of choosiness merit reconsideration: even if direct selection never 88 
favours preference alleles over random mating, the evolutionary dynamics do not always 89 
predict preference erosion. Costs can exist everywhere along the coevolutionary path towards 90 
the endpoint, which then, at equilibrium, features female choice that minimizes costs (as in 91 
Pomiankowski 1988). Importantly, preferences can evolve upwards along this path despite 92 
there being (continually diminishing) costs, because benefits have not yet vanished either. 93 
Empiricists emphasize that the costs of choosiness depend on the effort expended in mate 94 
searching and sampling: how long does it take, or how far must females travel, to find a 95 
suitable mate? Theoretical models, however, typically use fixed costs that depend only on 96 
whether a female carries a preference allele, or genes for greater expression of a preference 97 
(for an exception in a good genes context see Houle & Kondrashov (2002); in a speciation 98 
context see Gavrilets & Boake (1998) who include the cost of remaining unmated if the 99 
preferred male type is rare). We investigate a simple scenario where it proves important to 100 
take into account that the cost of a preference might change with the frequency of preferred 101 
males. This should affect how the net benefits of choosiness change during the 102 
coevolutionary process, with potential implications for evolutionary dynamics and for 103 
evolutionary stable outcomes.    104 
The fact that theoreticians have tended to ignore how relative encounter rates with preferred 105 
and non-preferred males affect the costs of choosiness is a surprising omission, especially 106 
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given the following statement by Andersson (1994, p. 43) in a book that almost every 107 
researcher working on sexual selection has read:  108 
“Preferences therefore may have a cost that is inversely related to the frequency of the 109 
preferred type of male. The dynamics and stability conditions of the system then change 110 
dramatically…”  111 
Despite this statement, the lack of research interest in this area is reflected in the fact that 112 
twelve of the thirteen well-known papers Andersson then cited (e.g. Lande, 1981; 113 
Kirkpatrick, 1982; Pomiankowski et al., 1991; Seger, 1985) actually did not model 114 
frequency-dependent costs (the sole exception being Pomiankowski, 1988). This is intriguing 115 
because formal Fisherian models appeared simultaneously alongside a burst of research 116 
investigating how mate sampling rules and preference functions affect mate quality (e.g. 117 
Janetos, 1980; Parker, 1983; Real, 1990). Subsequent work has not unified these subfields. 118 
Numerous theoretical studies have now considered the details of how mate sampling impacts 119 
the expected ‘quality’ (or trait value) of chosen males (Sullivan, 1994; Luttbeg, 1996; 120 
Mazalov et al., 1996; Wiegmann et al., 1996, 2010a,b, 2013; Johnstone, 1997; Hutchinson & 121 
Halupka, 2004; Wiegmann & Angeloni, 2007), but these appear not to have influenced 122 
theoretical work on the coevolution of preferences and traits. Even papers that involve mate 123 
sampling costs (e.g. Houle & Kondrashov, 2002) rarely cite this parallel literature as a source 124 
of inspiration. 125 
What would have happened if mate sampling theory had been formally incorporated into 126 
early Fisherian mate choice models? Here we show that it might have discouraged the 127 
textbook dogma that Fisherian benefits cannot, even in principle, sustain mating preferences 128 
if they impose costs (e.g. Cameron et al., 2003). In the context of female choice for ‘good 129 
genes’ (i.e. male viability indicator traits), a model that explicitly considered changes in mate 130 
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sampling costs (Houle & Kondrashov 2002) yielded different conclusions to those reached 131 
with a model invoking fixed costs of mating preferences (Kirkpatrick 1996) (although note 132 
that there are additional differences between these models).  133 
Our aim here is to construct a parallel comparison between an early model of Fisherian 134 
evolution (Kirkpatrick, 1982) and an approach that derives costs through explicitly modelled 135 
mate sampling. We do this in two ways: (i) by a two-locus model with all assumptions 136 
identical to early work, apart from introducing costs of choice that are based on explicit mate 137 
sampling, and (ii) by building an individual-based model that relaxes many potentially 138 
restrictive assumptions at once. We show that when choosy females pay smaller search costs 139 
as preferred males become more common, the outcome of preference-trait coevolution 140 
models changes dramatically. Contrary to early suggestions (Pomiankowski 1988), this can 141 
happen even if choice is never cheaper than random mating.  142 
Methods 143 
Model 1: a two-locus model 144 
Kirkpatrick (1982) provided a simple way to model indirect benefits given a female 145 
preference (P) for a male display trait (T) that reduces male viability. We follow this general 146 
approach. We assume a haploid population with discrete generations. Individuals of both 147 
sexes have two loci; one determines the presence (T1) or absence (T0) of a male-only display 148 
trait, the other determines whether a female preference for T1 males is present (P1) or absent 149 
(P0). Females mate once. The display trait is costly: the viability of T0 males is 1, that of T1 150 
males is 1 – s (s > 0). Both indirect and direct selection act on female preferences. We 151 
consider three versions: 152 
(a) Full model: Following suggestions that realistic mate choice might only involve sampling 153 
a few males (Roff & Fairbairn, 2014), we assume P1 females sequentially sample up to five 154 
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males, while P0 females mate with the first male encountered. If q is the frequency of T1 155 
males after viability selection, the probability that a P0 female mates with a T1 male is q. For 156 
a P1 female, we assume that she mates as soon as she encounters a T1 male, but if this has not 157 
happened by her fifth mating encounter, she accepts the current (T0) male. Hence:  158 
 Prob{sire is T1 | female is P1}= q + (1–q)q + (1–q)
2
q + (1–q)
3
q + (1–q)
4
q (1) 159 
A P0 female pays no cost of choosing as she always mates with the first male encountered. 160 
For a P1 female, the cost of choosing depends on how many males she samples before 161 
mating. The full cost (denoted c) is paid only if she mates with the fifth male encountered, 162 
while there is no cost if she mates at her first encounter (i.e., the same as for a P0 female). 163 
Assuming additively accumulating costs per sampling event, the expected cost for a P1 164 
female mating with a T1 male is 165 
 C = 



	

	



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
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 (2) 166 
A P1 female mating a T0 male must have sampled five males, so her cost is always c. 167 
(b) Hybrid model: sire identity is determined following the full model. P0 females again pay 168 
no sampling cost, but P1 females always pay the full cost c. Because the hybrid model 169 
combines an explicit sampling process with the assumption of classic models of female 170 
choice that costs of choosiness are unavoidable, comparing the outcomes of the hybrid model 171 
with the full model and the classic model (see below) helps to disentangle the independent 172 
roles of cost frequency-dependence and the effects of sampling on mate choice evolution. 173 
(c) Classic model: a P1 female mates with a T1 male with probability 174 
 Prob{sire is T1 | female is P1} = 


	, (3) 175 
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where a is equivalent to a2 in Kirkpatrick (1982) (one interpretation is that a P1 female is a 176 
times more likely to mate a T1 than T0 male in a two-choice test). The probability that a P0 177 
female mates with a T1 male is q. All P1 females pay the full cost c.   178 
The models track genotype frequencies in each generation (see Appendix), assuming the 179 
order is: (1) viability selection on T1 males; (2) females choose mates; (3) females breed 180 
(given a cost C or c, female fecundity is multiplied by (1–C) or (1–c)); (4) parents die. We 181 
also included an option at step (4) for biased mutation converting T1 to T0 (i.e. trait loss) at 182 
the rate µ. This allows us to contrast our results with models where biased mutation maintains 183 
female preferences (Pomiankowski et al., 1991). 184 
Model 2: an individual-based simulation 185 
Kuijper et al. (2012) review four different approaches to implementing the Fisher process. To 186 
check whether the gist of our argument based on the simplest approach holds, we use the last, 187 
and most complex, approach: an individual-based simulation (see also Roff & Fairbain, 188 
2014). The most important assumption to relax is the dichotomous nature of ornaments and 189 
preferences. In the individual-based simulation, each individual is characterized by its sex, by 190 
100 haploid loci with alleles 0 or 1 for an additive male trait T (expressed only in males), and 191 
one haploid allele that takes positive integer values and specifies the female preference 192 
threshold P (expressed only in females). We assume a mutation rate µ for the female 193 
preference and µ/100 for each locus of the male trait (thus leading to the same overall 194 
mutation pressure for preferences and traits alike). Female choice requires that males exceed 195 
a threshold trait value: a female with preference P will mate with males whose sum of allelic 196 
values is at least P. Mate sampling occurs as in the full and hybrid two-locus models, with 197 
costs accumulating in the same way such that females who reach the maximum number of 198 
mates sampled (N) pay the highest cost. As a further check of robustness, we combine results 199 
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derived with N = 5 (as in the two-locus models) with others that use N = 10. Details of the 200 
model are given in the Electronic Appendix. 201 
Results and Discussion 202 
As in all Fisherian models, the mating preference must initially exceed a threshold frequency 203 
(invasion barrier) in order to increase and be maintained by indirect selection (Fig. 1: green 204 
area). We considered six scenarios in the two-locus model (the full, hybrid, and classic model 205 
variants, either with or without biased mutation on the male trait). For easier visualization in 206 
Fig. 1, we use relatively large values for both the maximum cost of the female preference (c = 207 
0.01: sampling five males reduces female fecundity by 1%), and the cost of the male trait (s = 208 
0.4: T1 males have 40% lower survival). Smaller costs lower the invasion barrier to 209 
preference (and trait) increase and maintenance. For example, if c = 0.001 and s = 0.1, an 210 
initial preference prevalence of 4% is sufficient to lead to trait maintenance (if the male trait 211 
has ≥ 2% prevalence initially).  212 
We first consider what happens without biased mutation on the male trait. When sampling 213 
costs decline as the frequency of preferred T1 males increases, the male trait goes to fixation if 214 
the initial frequency of the preference exceeds the invasion barrier (the full model, Fig. 1a). 215 
At equilibrium there is no direct selection on the mating preference: all males are of the 216 
preferred type, so both P0 and P1 females mate with the first male they encounter. As T1 is 217 
fixed, there is also no longer indirect selection on the preference allele. This results in a 218 
neutral line of equilibria (see Appendix). In contrast, when sampling costs are independent of 219 
the frequency of T1 males, a costly preference, and hence costly male display, cannot persist 220 
at equilibrium (both the classic and hybrid models, Fig. 1c). The crucial difference is 221 
therefore due to the frequency-dependence of the costs of choice, and not to how the mate-222 
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sampling tactic determines mate identity: although the hybrid model uses an explicit 223 
sampling process, the fixed cost of choosiness ensures neither the preference nor trait persist.  224 
A purely Fisherian process (indirect selection on a mating preference arising solely from 225 
linkage disequilibrium with a preferred male trait under direct selection) can thus maintain a 226 
costly male sexual display even when the preference carries costs due to active mate 227 
sampling, and when random mating is included as a ‘cheap’ alternative. Previously the 228 
evolutionary stability of a preference for such Fisherian traits has only been demonstrated 229 
when there is biased mutation on the male trait (e.g. Pomiankowski et al., 1991).  230 
In the individual-based model, where we relax the assumption that male traits and female 231 
preferences are dichotomous variables, the preference thresholds used by females evolve to 232 
be consistently below the mean of the male trait distribution (see the Electronic Appendix). 233 
Preferences and traits coevolve until they drift along a line that appears — to the extent that it 234 
is possible to deduce this from an individual-based simulation — neutral. In the depicted 235 
trajectories of Fig. 2, we found no evidence of preference decay, and neither were collapsing 236 
cases found when we tried starting simulations from 50 randomly chosen parameter settings 237 
(Fig. 2, shaded area). Although the dynamic consequences of a preference threshold clearly 238 
differ from those arising from the simpler preferences implemented in the full two-locus 239 
model, the findings of both models are consistent with our general interpretation: preferences 240 
can evolve upwards when both benefits and costs are significant, and this directional 241 
evolution stops once males have evolved to ‘satisfy’ female preferences and costs have 242 
become irrelevant. 243 
We are aware that it is tempting to dismiss our findings as somehow trivial because the 244 
mating preference becomes cost-free at equilibrium. We argue that this would be uncharitable 245 
as: (i) the preference imposes costs at every point on the evolutionary trajectory towards 246 
Page 15 of 29 Journal of Evolutionary Biology
12 
 
equilibrium, so the situation modelled is not analogous to that of classic cost-free models 247 
(e.g. Kirkpatrick, 1982); (ii) the biological reality is that preference costs are rarely 248 
independent of the frequency of preferred males, so it is an artificial construct to maintain a 249 
cost where none would exist; (iii) it is not obvious a priori that the rate at which direct 250 
selection against a preference declines can be greater than the rate at which indirect benefits 251 
decline (due to less variation in attractiveness as T1 approaches fixation); (iv) intriguingly the 252 
model accounts for male traits persisting despite no current advantage to choosiness. 253 
We next consider what happens given biased mutation on the male trait. In the examples 254 
presented (Fig. 1b, d) the mutation rate is low (µ = 0.0001). When sampling costs decline as 255 
preferred T1 males increase in frequency, becoming easier to find, there are only two 256 
equilibrium points (the full model, Fig. 1b). Again, if the initial preference frequency lies 257 
below the invasion barrier, the preference and trait are eliminated. If above the invasion 258 
barrier, however, the preference becomes fixed while the male trait almost reaches fixation 259 
(the proximity depends on µ: the lower it is, the closer the trait is to fixation). The indirect 260 
benefit of choosiness (due to variation in male genotypes, q < 1) exceeds, in this example, the 261 
strength of direct selection, so the preference increases in frequency until it reaches fixation. 262 
Again, it was unclear a priori that the relative rate of decline in direct selection could exceed 263 
that of indirect selection.  264 
It is well established theoretically that biased mutation can sustain a costly preference 265 
(Pomiankowski et al., 1991). In our example, a frequency-independent cost of choice 266 
eliminates both the preference and male trait (the hybrid and classic models, Fig. 1d). Of 267 
course, we emphasize that this would not have occurred had we used a sufficiently high 268 
mutation rate. The point we wish to make, however, is that a mutation rate too low to 269 
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maintain a preference with a fixed cost (Fig. 1d) can maintain it when costs are explicitly 270 
derived from mate sampling theory (Fig. 1b). 271 
Our model does not explain how a mating preference initially increases in frequency to 272 
exceed an invasion barrier. Nor does it fully resolve the lek paradox (why females are choosy 273 
if choice depletes variation), as it ignores non-additive and environmental factors that affect 274 
male trait expression. This is a potential limitation of the model because such factors reduce 275 
indirect selection on the mating preference (i.e. choosy females less often acquire fitter sons), 276 
but it should be noted that most models of preference-trait coevolution similarly avoid this 277 
complication.  278 
For empiricists it is worth reflecting on the difference in observations when viewing a 279 
population moving towards equilibrium (A) and another already at equilibrium (B). In A it is 280 
possible to detect costs of choosiness that are up to 1% of a female’s fecundity, and observe 281 
that the mating success of sons depends on their father’s genotype (T0 or T1). In contrast, in B 282 
all males have a costly trait, and most (Fig. 1a) or all (Fig. 1b) females have a cost-free 283 
mating preference for this trait (demonstrable by experimental manipulation of trait 284 
expression to induce the requisite variation). Despite this, there is no measurable advantage 285 
for the sons of females that mated with preferred males. It would obviously be puzzling to 286 
field researchers as to why females have evolved to prefer ornamented males in population B. 287 
Our model is a reminder that variation among males in the evolutionary past could have 288 
created coevolutionary forces that drove female preferences to their current levels, where 289 
they are now hard to explain. Preferences become non-neutral again, re-establishing indirect 290 
selection and observable trait-preference coevolution, as soon as populations are pushed to 291 
the interior of Fig. 1. This would occur, for example, if increased mutation rates reduce the 292 
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male trait. It is possible that empirical observations of female choice for currently non-293 
beneficial male traits partially reflect ‘the ghost of selection past’.  294 
In sum, much of the frustration in testing sexual selection theory hinges on the prediction that 295 
direct selection against mating preferences easily outweighs indirect selection to mate non-296 
randomly. Our results reinforce this message: minute differences in direct costs affect our 297 
ability to explain male traits (e.g. the classic two-locus model; Fig. 1), but our models also 298 
include cases where predictable variation in costs becomes essential for the maintenance of a 299 
preference.  300 
The as such correct statement, that it is difficult to explain costly female choice for indirect 301 
benefits, should therefore be accompanied by reminders that the magnitude of benefits and 302 
costs can change dynamically during preference-trait coevolution, and that these changes do 303 
not necessarily occur at the same rate. If costs diminish faster than benefits, the evolutionary 304 
outcome can be far more choosiness than if the opposite is true. For empiricists, there is 305 
obvious potential to quantify the magnitude of frequency-dependent changes in the costs of 306 
choosiness by experimental manipulation of the frequency of different male types. One of the 307 
key messages, however, is that this might be a difficult task: we predict preferences will 308 
persist precisely where evolution has led the currently expressed costs to be minimal. 309 
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Appendix 375 
Our two-locus model largely follows the derivation of Kirkpatrick (1982), which is 376 
beautifully explained in expanded form (including mutations) in chapter 2 of Rice (2004).  377 
Populations in Fig. 1 are initialized assuming no linkage disequilibrium. Thus, if the initial 378 
frequency of the preference is assumed to be x and that of the male trait to be y, genotype 379 
frequencies in the initial generation are 380 
p00 = (1–x)(1–y),  p01 = (1–x)y,  p10 = x(1–y),  p11 = xy, 381 
where the first subscript denotes the value of the P allele, and the second refers to the T allele. 382 
Each generation then first applies viability selection, which modifies the frequency of T1 383 
males in the current generation to 384 
q = 
  !
  ! !! !
 385 
This value of q is then used to calculate mate identities and costs paid by females (equations 386 
1–3 in main text).  387 
Thereafter, offspring production follows the probabilities of each female finding a sire of 388 
each genotype, and Mendelian laws of genetics. Consider, for example, the production of 389 
P1T1 offspring (the bookkeeping for the three other offspring types proceeds similarly). All 390 
matings between P1T1 females and P1T1 males lead to P1T1 offspring (before mutation). But 391 
so do half of the offspring produced in matings between P1T1 females and P1T0 males, 392 
between P1T0 females and P1T1 males, between P0T1 females and P1T1 males, or between P1T1 393 
females and P0T1 males. Finally, one quarter of the offspring produced by P1T0 females 394 
mating with P0T1 males, and of matings between P0T1 females mating with P1T0 males, also 395 
become P1T1. The proportions are multiplied by 1–c or 1–C where relevant: for example, 396 
neither cost applies to P0T1 females mating with any kind of male. 397 
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Thereafter, mutations occur: a proportion µ of P1T1 (P0T1) offspring become P1T1 (P0T0). 398 
After normalizing, the new generation is ready. 399 
The model yields, in principle, an analytic expression for the change of allele frequencies, but 400 
in the interior of Fig. 1 the expressions are too unwieldy to yield much insight, and are not 401 
reproduced here (the Mathematica file is available upon request). However, they simplify to 402 
zero when assumption set (a) is combined with p01 = p11 = 0, which indicates that the female 403 
preference becomes neutral when the male trait is fixed. This makes intuitive sense, as in that 404 
case the realized mating behaviour does not differ between choosy and randomly mating 405 
females (neither in terms of mate identity nor the sampling effort taken). 406 
  407 
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Fig. 1. Frequencies of preference allele (P1) and T1 males after viability selection in the two-408 
locus models. Evolutionary trajectories (arrowed lines) always start from the same four 409 
representative points. Solid circles indicate evolutionary endpoints (equilibria). The full 410 
model output is in (a) and (b), showing that the system can equilibrate with positive traits and 411 
preferences. The green area indicates initial combinations that generate a coevolutionary 412 
increase in P1 and T1 towards such equilibria. Such combinations are completely absent in the 413 
hybrid model (solid lines) and classic model (dotted line), depicted in (c) and (d): thus 414 
constant costs rather than the effect of sampling on mate identity is responsible for the 415 
difference in outcome. Biased mutation on male traits is either absent (a, c) or present at µ = 416 
0.0001 (b, d).  417 
Fig. 2. Coevolution of female preference thresholds and male traits in the individual-based 418 
simulation, with c = 0.01, µ = 0.01 and either a maximum of N = 5 sampled males (11 419 
depicted trajectories) or N = 10 (the 50 trajectories are not depicted, location of all endpoints 420 
indicated by the green shaded area). We depict 11 trajectories that start at the black squares as 421 
indicated (to cover a range of values where either the preference or the trait is not yet strong), 422 
and end at the red stars at generation 10000. For clarity in a simulation that was run for 10000 423 
generations per trajectory, the lines track the mean allelic values of each population only 424 
every 100 generations. To increase the robustness of the conclusion that simulations do not 425 
collapse, and that preferences and traits can coevolve to higher values their initial starting 426 
values, we ran our N = 10 (maximum number of males sampled) examples from random 427 
starting points: each case was started such that mean female preference threshold was 428 
randomized to be between 0 and 50, and mean male traits were between 0 and 90. None of 429 
the outcomes at generation 10000 were found outside the green shaded area. The overall 430 
conclusion is that all populations evolve to spend much of the evolutionary time near a line 431 
where the mean male trait values somewhat exceed the mean threshold mating preference 432 
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values; some populations evolve males with strongly compromised survival (male traits 433 
higher than 75 lead to more than 50% male viability reduction, and 8 out of 50 random runs 434 
exhibited such values at generation 10000; 2 of these had the trait persist at its maximum 435 
where all 100 male trait alleles had the value 1). 436 
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Electronic appendix 
Our individual-based simulation is run in a population of 2000 individuals as follows: 
1. Each individual is characterized by its sex (initially randomly determined), by 100 haploid 
loci with alleles 0 or 1 for the male trait T (expressed only in males), and one haploid allele 
that takes integer values and specifies the female preference threshold P (expressed only in 
females). Initially a proportion 0 ≤ T0 < 1 of male trait alleles are set to 1. Female alleles are 
set to uniformly distributed random values between 0 and 2P0, implying that the mean 
preference threshold of the first generation will be P0. 
2. A generation is considered to begin at the start of the mating season. Each female is given 
a set of N randomly chosen males to evaluate. She samples them one at a time until an 
acceptable one, i.e. one who has at least as many alleles of value 1 as the female’s threshold 
implies, is found. Mate sampling stops at mating. If none of the males exceed the female 
threshold, she mates with the last male and is recorded to have sampled N males. 
3. A total of 2000 offspring are created. Each of them is assigned a mother and a father in the 
following way. Females compete for being a mother of a young, with competitiveness of each 
female being    
   
   
 if she sampled n males out of the N before mating. This implies that a 
female who mated with the first male (n = 1) pays no cost (her competitiveness is 1), and a 
female who samples all N males has her competitiveness reduced to 1 – c. Offspring are 
assigned to mothers probabilistically in proportion to mothers’ competitiveness, which 
implies that a mother’s fecundity is proportional to the competitiveness value she was 
potentially compromising through mate sampling. 
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4. Offspring are created through Mendelian inheritance based on the mother’s and the sire’s 
known identities. Offspring sex is randomly determined. Parents die. 
5. Preference alleles mutate. We assume a mutation rate μ for the female preference and 
μ/100 for each locus of the male trait (thus leading to the same overall mutation pressure for 
preferences and traits alike). Male trait mutations switch allelic values between 0 and 1. 
Female preference mutations reduce or increase (50% either way) the threshold by one, with 
the exception of mutations that would make the preference negative, which we assume have 
no effect. 
6. Male traits reduce male survival. Each male survives with probability   
 
             
 
where T is the sum of all his trait alleles. This function takes a declining logistic shape: small 
traits do not significantly harm survival, while 75 positive alleles are sufficient to halve his 
survival; however we do not assume that survival is completely impossible at any level of 
trait development: 
 
7. The new generation is ready to mate; we go to step 2 and repeat steps 2-7 for 10000 
generations. 
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